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Abstract
Many Developing Countries ratiﬁed ILO Fundamental Conventions and authorized local labour
unions. Multinational companies producing in these countries pay more when NGOs campaigns
take place and reputation counts. However, whether this external pressure from NGOs beneﬁt
local workers outside MNEs afﬁliates in host countries remains an open issue. Segmented and
weak local labour unions often rely on external funding from the North and technical assistance
by labour NGOs. They need to increase their visibility in the labour intensive sectors targeted by
Northern donations and activism. To address these issues we develop a bargaining model adapted
to peculiarities of labour market institutions in developing countries, i.e. external funding and the
complementaritywithlabourNGOs. ThismodelisestimatedondataonIndonesianmanufacturing
ﬁrms, before and after the authorisation of labour unions, in sensitive and non sensitive sectors.
We ﬁnd that, in sector with visibility for labour unions, the net outcome on wages of the
presence of NGOs is negative. The external fundings imply a distortion in the objective of labour
unions, confronted with the constraint of increasing the employment in the formal sector.
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11 Introduction
In the last decades two major actors of globalization develop: Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)
with their subcontractors network (Antras & Helpman (2004)), and international Non Govern-
mental Organisations (NGOs) (Aldashev & Verdier (2009)). They also interact with each other
through the increasing outside monitoring carried on by international NGOs. Civil society and
international NGOs accuse MNEs of not complying with labour standards in their afﬁliates in De-
veloping Countries. Recent studies show how MNEs pay more when NGOs campaigns take place
and reputation counts (Harrison & Scorse (2010)). However, there is still an open issue: if this
external pressure from NGOs beneﬁt local workers outside MNEs afﬁliates in host countries.
Due to reputation effect, Developing Countries shifted towards more labour protections (Car-
away (2004)). They ratiﬁed ILO Fundamental Conventions, improved domestic labour laws and
authorized local labour unions. However, despite this reshaped regulatory environment, there is
still a limited impact. It depends on one hand on weak enforcement institutions and on the other
hand on ﬁnancing issue for local labour unions and lack of expertise in collective bargaining in
countries where labour unions have been banned for long. The role of weak enforcement insti-
tutions has been well documented (Martins & Esteves (2007), Bigsten et al. (2003)). We will
focus here on the complex relation between NGOs from the North, labour unions in the South,
and labour NGOs in the South.
In several developing countries labour unions cannot be ﬁnanced by poor workers. They rely
on Northern NGOs’ ﬁnancing. The latter is to large extent dependent on labour union visibility
that is related to the number of members employed in formal sector. At the same time, Northern
NGOs themselves are ﬁnanced by public or private money in the North. Therefore, Northern
NGOs are inclined to ﬁnance labour unions and local labour NGOs operating in speciﬁc sectors in
order to satisfy a political demand.1 All along the analysis, we deﬁne those sectors as "sensitive
sectors". The basic idea is that higher visibility of labour unions earns a premium in sector targeted
by Northern donors.
Labour intensive activities are on the top of the list. Well-known examples are campaigns
1"Responsible" consumers care on workers conditions in poor countries. While political authority and labour unions
in the North might support labour unions in the South in order to raise the level of labour standards and reduce the
competitiveness of these countries in the international market. This is a sort of "indirect trade policy". The impact of
this kind of measure on labour market in developing countries is an important issue to be analysed.
2conducted by Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC)2. In 2006, True Blue was a joint campaign by the
Dutch Clean Clothes Campaign, Amnesty International, Fair Wear Foundation, Goede Waar and
Co (consumer organisation) with the aim to raise awareness of working conditions in the Chinese
garment industry. According to the General Secretary of the Indonesian Federation of Independent
Trade Union, the Clean Clothes Campaign enables them "to join with workers and activists around
the world" so they don’t have to face "their struggle alone".3
Most outside ﬁnancing comes from international trade unions such as International Trade
Union Confederation (ITUC)4, or trade union solidarity organisations such as the American Cen-
ter for Interantional Labor Solidarity (ACILS)5. In 2005, ACILS gave USD 156,624 to strengthen
unions’ internal democratic mechanisms and the ability of trade unions to organise and represent
workers in Latin Region (Paraguay, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil). In the same year, ACILS
gave USD 236,485 to promote women’s rights and improve working conditions for women la-
borers to a chinese NGOs.6 In 2008-09, Union Aid Abroad-APHEDA 7 sent USD 10,000 to the
Philippines trade union federation, the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), to assist organisers’ training
course.
Despite this common source of funding, local labour unions and local NGOs cooperate in
various regions of the world, including Southeast Asia. In Thailand, trade unions and NGOs cam-
paigned jointly for improvements in occupational health and safety after a ﬁre killed 188 people in
a toy factory in May 1993 and have since developed new alliances (Brown (2004)). In Malaysia,
women’s NGOs and women’s section of the Malaysian Trade Union Congress worked together
on many issues (Crinis (2008)). A Jakarta-based grassroots NGO activist states that "the task of
2The Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC)is an international network that comprises a wide variety of organisations,
such as trade unions, consumer organisations, researchers, solidarity groups, women’s organisations, church groups,
youth movements and worldshops. The aim is to improve working conditions in the global garment industry and to
empower workers, most of whom are women, "with the ultimate goal of ending the oppression, exploitation and abuse
in this sector"
3Emelia Ianti Mala Dewi Sihaan, CCC website
4The ITUC Solidarity Fund gives assistance to trade union action in the countries where it is most needed. It
helps organisations and individuals facing hardship or repression, and supports trade union campaigns, organising and
strengthening capacities and structures. The oversight and management of the Fund is done by the Solidarity Fund
Management Board. In 2010, the Fund supported activities to a total of 1 million Euros. The Fund is ﬁnanced by
voluntary contributions from ITUC afﬁliates
5ACILS, a non-proﬁt US organisation ﬁnanced for 96 per cent by US government
6Notice that independent labour unions were not allowed in China in this period
7APHEDA is the overseas humanitarian aid agency of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). The agency,
established by the ACTU in 1984 as a means for Australian workers, through their unions, to directly assist international
development by supporting projects for workers in developing countries
3NGOs is to encourage workers to form unions, not to control them. NGOs have to raise their
self-awareness so that they see the need to organise" Ford (2005). This suggest the existence of a
complementarity between local labour NGOs activity and labour unions. While several Develop-
ing Countries have authorised recently labour unions, there is often a lack of collective bargaining
background. In such context, local labour NGOs provide technical and legal assistence to workers,
give informations on domestic labour laws and workers’ rights.
Therefore, the presence of labour NGOs might change the outcome of collective bargaining in
countries lacking a culture of negotiation.
While the literature has so far focused on the impact of NGOs activism on labour conditions in
multinational afﬁliates, we focus in this paper on domestic ﬁrms to analyse the role of local labour
NGOs supporting local labour unions on workers outside MNEs afﬁliates. Focusing on domestic
ﬁrms implies that the channel of reputation of the ﬁrm is no longer relevant. The purpose of this
paper is to investigate how the presence of NGOs and "visibility premium" of the labour union
interact with each other and their impact on the bargaining power of workers.
We develop a bargaining model studying the interaction between the visibility premium, the
bargaining power and the outside opportunity of workers in the individual wage determination in
developing countries. As aforementioned, in poor countries local labour unions (where allowed)
face ﬁnancial constraint. They rely on external funding from the North. This imply a distortion
in the traditional labour union objective (i.e. increase wage). Labour unions want also to in-
crease their visibility, and thus the number of members in the formal sector. As explained above,
labour movement in developing countries is also characterized by a complementarity between lo-
cal labour NGOs and local labour union. The basic idea is that local labour NGOs affect the
outside opportunity of workers by increasing the available information on labour rights. The im-
plicit assumption is that NGOs cannot directly affect the bargaining power of workers. Indeed,
ﬁrms might avoid to comply with labour standards due to weak enforcement institutions and cor-
ruption. This is not central to our demonstration and has been extensively documented elsewhere.
Domestic ﬁrms are not even concerned about reputation as they do not export, at least directly.
Our two main theoretical results are as follows. Wage increases with the presence of labour
NGOs. However, wage decreases with the visibility premium in sensitive sector. The intuition
is that local labour unions have two contradictory objectives in "sensitive" sectors: increase their
4visibility on the top of the traditional wage objective.
To test these predictions, we need data on domestic manufacturing ﬁrms, belonging or not
to sensitive sectors, before and after the authorisation of labour unions, in presence or not of
local labour NGOs. Indonesia offers such a combination and will be used in the following. We
will make use of a difference-in-difference-in-difference method, in order to take into account the
external shock (before and after the labor law), the role of the complementarity between labour
NGOs and labour unions (province with/without labor NGOs) and the visibility premium (textile
versus other sectors).
We test our theoretical predictions by analysing Data of the Indonesia Manufacturing Industry
over the period 1991-2005. This period covers the Trade union Act of 2000, that authorised
independent labour union.8
Local labour NGOs played an important role in the Indonesian working-class movement.The
post-Suharto era is deﬁned by a strong complementarity between local labour unions and lo-
cal labour NGOs. Ford (2005) explains how Indonesia’s labour non-government organizations
(NGOs) are in fact part of a global surge in non-traditional labour activism, in which international
and indigenous labour NGOs have played an important role. Most local NGOs and labor unions
are ﬁnanced by foreign NGOs. These donations are either project or time based. Over the last
years, Northern NGOs have focused on workers condition in Indonesian labour intensive sectors,
such as textile, footwear and apparel.9
WeﬁndthatwagesarehigherinprovinceswithlabourNGOswithrespecttoprovinceswithout
labour NGOs. Therefore, the complementarity between labour NGOs and labour union has a
positive impact on wage. The presence of NGOs gives power to labour union (increase the outside
option of workers). However, labour unions have also the objective to increase the number of
member employed in formal sector, i.e. increase their visibility. We ﬁnd that the net outcome on
wages of the presence of NGOs in sector with visibility premium for labour union is negative.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the bargaining model,
Section 3 the empirical analysis based on manufacturing industry in Indonesia, while Section 4
concludes.
8During the Suharto Regime only one labour union was ofﬁcially recognized by the government. Independent
labour unions were not only banned but also severely repressed. The Trade Union Act of 2000 permitted groups of 10
or more workers to form union also at ﬁrm level.
9For more detail on this issue see section 3.1
52 Bargaining Model
We consider the case where ﬁrm and labour unions bargaining over wages and employment. We
assume that negotiation takes place at ﬁrm level. Wages are determined as in a Nash problem in
which 0    1 represents the workers bargaining power. The maximisation problem is the
following:
[wn + an   u(w)n][1 ] (2.1)
where w represents the wage if bargaining success and w the outside earnings workers if they
are not employed in the current ﬁrm; a  0 represents the visibility premium of the labour union;
n indicates the employment level and  denotes proﬁt.
The workers outside option can also be characterised as:
w = c(wo;b;) (2.2)
where wo is the outside wage, b the informal beneﬁt, and  represents the NGOs advocacy.
The basic idea is that NGOs activities increase the outside option of workers by providing
more information on labour rights and job opportunities. Indeed, the threat of local NGOs on
domestic ﬁrms is not credible since reputation does not account for those ﬁrms. The available
and credible instrument whose dispose labour NGOs is the advocacy activity in order to inform
workers on their rights.
By solving the maximisation problem and after substitution we get the wage equation:




6Lemma 1: Under bargaining, equilibrium wage is a decreasing function of visibility premium
(a  0) of labour union; increasing function of proﬁt per employees; inceasing function of work-
ers outside option.
The intuition is that local labour unions have two contradictory objectives: increase their vis-
ibility on the top of the traditional wage objective. The visibility is represented by the number
of members employed in the formal sector. Higher visibility implies more donors’ fundings. We
keep as exogenous (a > 0) these outside funding. For the present analysis other assumptions on
the outside funding mechanism are not necessary. This visibility earns a premium a > 0 in sectors
where donors’ (i.e. consumer and policy makers) interest in the North is higher.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Background
Indonesia is an ideal case study of our theoretical settings, due to the variability over time in labour
market relations. President Suharto’s10 resignation in may 1998 changed deeply Indonesia’s in-
dustrial relations landscape. The new government ratiﬁed eight ILO Conventions; one of them was
Convention N. 87 on the "Freedom of Association and the Protection on the Right to Organise".
During the Suharto Regime only one labor union was ofﬁcially recognised by the government.
Independent labor unions were not only banned but also severely repressed. The Trade Union
Act of 2000 permitted groups of 10 or more workers to form union also at ﬁrm level. By August
2000, 24 national union organisations and over 10,000 enterprise unions had registered with the
Departement of Manpower.11 Caraway (2004) argues that labour success in the immediate post-
Suharto years can be explained by the international pressure to restore basic labour rights and the
early remobilisation of labour in contrast to employers after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. 12
However, despite this reshaped regulatory environment, there is still a limited impact not only
10Suharto was the second president of Indonesia, holding the ofﬁce from 1967 to 1998.
11Notice that the Department of Manpower could still withdraw ofﬁcial recognition of union that didn’t meet admin-
istrative requirements, and the courts could dissolve unions whose leaders deemed to "threaten national security".
12There were two other important labour laws in these years. The "Manpower Act" (law n.13/2003) and the Law
2001 on minimum wage. The "Manpower Act" deﬁnes rules on the right to strike while the Law 2001 the right to set
the minimum wage was transferred from the central government to the local government (at province level).
7due to weak enforcement institutions,13 but also due to labour market features, in particular the
lack of tradition in terms of labour market negotiations. In absence of free labour unions, the last
period of the Suharto regime was characterised by radical and violent movements. After the Trade
Union Act was passed in 2000, the lack of expertise on collective bargaining and technical skills
reduced the impact of independent labour unions on workers’ conditions. To some extent, this
lack of expertise is compensated by the activism of local labour NGOs. During the last years, such
NGOs have played an important role in Indonesia society and particularly in the working-class
movement. The pro-labour NGOs provided important services to workers and labour organi-
sations. They offered legal advice and legal services, teaching about labour law, and helping to
release workers from jail when they are arrested. Indeed, NGOs were the most important source of
support to workers Botz (2001). To summarise, the cooperation with labour NGOs was important
to rebuild a negotiation capacity of labour union. Most local NGOs and labor unions rely heavily
on international donors for funding. Most outside ﬁnancing comes from Northern NGOs such as
ACILS,anon-proﬁtUSorganisation(ﬁnancedfor96percentbyUSgovernment), NOVIB-Oxfam
(Dutch), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (German) and APHEDA (Australia), Ford (2005).14
In the last years, consistent with our sensitive sector hypothesis, main sectors targeted in In-
donesia were textile, footwear and apparel. APHEDA gave donations to labour unions in Bandung
for several years, where much of the workforce is employed in the footwear, clothing and textile
industries. ACILs in 2005 assigned USD 90,000 to work with local garments and textile unions.
Novib support Clean Clothes Campaigns (CCC) a network organisation whose its aim is also
supporting workers, trade unions and NGOs in producers countries.
3.2 Data summary
The Dataset used in this analysis is derived from the annual manufacturing survey of Indone-
sia collected and compiled by the Indonesian government’s statistical agency BPS (Badan Pusat
13In our empirical analysis, we control for weak enforcement institutions by using the Difference-in-Difference
method. In our sample the external shocks are the new labour laws, while enforcement institutions did not change over
time.
14As aforementioned, despite this common source of funding, there exist also in Indonesia a strong complementarity
between labour NGOs activity and labour unions. Some large trade unions saw labour NGOs as a useful source of
technical and other kinds of assistance (McKay (2006)). Leaders of trade unions associated with the Congress of
Indonesian Trade Unions (Kongres Serikat Pekerja Indonesia, KSPI) agree that such NGOs can play a valuable and
ongoing role in the labour movement Ford (2009). Activists also emphasised the "synergy" and “symbiosis” between
trade unions and NGOs Ford (2005).
8Statistik). The BPS submits a questionnaire annually to all registered manufacturing establish-
ment with 20 or more employees. The data cover the period before and after the Trade Union
Act of 2000. The number of observation is around 20,000 ﬁrms per year. As aforementioned, we
restrict our analysis to domestic ﬁrms, around 18,000 ﬁrms. There is information about employees
(wages) and each ﬁrm (industry, region, size, ownership, etc.)
Column(1) inTable1 showsthemean ofthe realwagesin Rupiahforthe manufacturingsector
for year 1991-1996 and 2004-2005. We deﬁne the average wage as the total wage of production
workers at ﬁrm level divided by the number of production workers. As Harrison and Scorse (2010)
we focus on production workers wages, which we use as a proxy of unskilled workers.
We consider the period 1991-1996 before the Trade Union Act (2000)as opposed to the period
2005-2006. We focus on these years, since the ﬁnancial crisis in 1997 and the fall of the Suharto
Regime in 1998 makes the analysis of post 1996 problematic (Harrison & Scorse (2010)). The
economic situation pre-crisis was re-established just after 2002 (Rahayu & Sumarto (2003)).
Table 1 shows the mean of the wage, proﬁt-per-employees and the number of workers (un-
skilled and skilled) in the period analysed. Rows (1) and (2) of Table 2 report the average wage
in province without labour NGOs, our control group, and in province with labour NGOs, our
treatment group. The results of t-test reported in rows (3) of Table 2 shows that the difference in
mean of wage between provinces with labour NGOs and provinces without labour NGOs are not
statistically signiﬁcant.
To summarise, the trends presented in Table 2 indicate no difference in wage between treat-
ment and control group before the labour law. This suggest that during the Suharto regime domes-
tic ﬁrms payed the same wage.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Wage equation
We ﬁrst estimate the simple wage equation inspired by the theoretical model in order to measure
the bargaining power of workers in domestic ﬁrms.
9From equation (2.3), we can consider the following wage equation:
lnwijrt =  + 1
ijrt
nijrt
+ 2TFAi + r + t + ijrt (3.1)
lnwijrt is the log of the average wage in ﬁrm i,in sector j, in province r and in period t; ijrt
is the proﬁt of the ﬁrm i,in sector j, in province r and in period t; nijrt is the number of employees
in the same ﬁrm; TFA is a sector dummy with TFA = 1 if the ﬁrm is in textile, footwear or apparel
sectorand TFA= 0if otherwise; r andt areﬁxed effectper provinceand peryear. The parameter
1 indicates the bargaining power of workers.
We proxy the visibility premium (a  0) with the sector dummy variable TFA. In Indonesia
donors’ funding was sector speciﬁc in these years. Therefore, as noted above, labour unions and
local labour NGOs received money from Northern NGOs if they operated in garment sector.
Following an approach similar to Martins (2004), we proxy rents using "gross proﬁts" 15 (i.e.
proﬁts before subtracting the wage bill), in order to avoid the bias that arises from the fact that
ﬁrms that share more rents will also have lower net proﬁts, the standard measure of rents used in
the literature.
Our initial results, presented in Column (1) in Table (3), are obtained using an unbalanced
panel regression. We estimate the outside option of workers by including in the regression ﬁxed
effect per province and year. Indeed, the outside wage (i.e. minimum wage), the informal beneﬁt
and the presence of NGOs are province and time variables. Table (3) presents the results for gross
proﬁts, indicating a positive and signiﬁcant 1 of 0.003. This ﬁrst result suggests that rent sharing
is indeed an existing factor in the Indonesian labour market. The sector dummy, TFA, is negative.
This is in line with our theoretical ﬁndings. The visibility premium affect negatively the wage.
3.3.2 Instrumental Variable
It is necessary to consider the simultaneity between proﬁt and wage in estimating equation (3.1),
where the equilibrium wage is determined by the level of proﬁt-per-employees. Indeed, proﬁts and
wages are simultaneously determined. We use an instrument in order to deal with endogeneity.
15Results do not change even if we consider net proﬁt.
10The instrumental variable used is a component of the revenue of the ﬁrm, those related to ﬁ-
nancial investments, participation in other ﬁrms, and non-operational activities. Our identiﬁcation
assumption followed the approach used by Martins & Esteves (2007). Those components of prof-
its do not affect directly wages, although they are correlated with proﬁts. The basic idea is that
bargaining over wages is typically related to proﬁts in the ﬁrm’s mainstream activities, e.g. the
sales of garments in a garment industry. If the ﬁrm knows a raise in proﬁts driven by activities
unrelated to the production of garments, e.g. selling a different company, unions will typically be
less likely to bargain over those proﬁts (Martins & Esteves (2007)).
Column (2) in Table (3) presents our results using 2SLS method, considering the ﬁnancial
instruments. We start by investigating the strength of the instrument in the ﬁrst-stage equation, as
measured by the values of the F-test of the instrument: the coefﬁcients of the instrument is highly
signiﬁcant.
In terms of the main equation, we ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients are as before of 0.003 but now
no longer signiﬁcant. These ﬁndings indicate that the traditional rent sharing is not an important
feature of the Indonesia labour market. Therefore, the evidence of rent sharing showed in simple
models that do not account for the endogeneity of proﬁts can be misleading. The higher wages
of employees of more proﬁtable ﬁrms are artiﬁcially driven by the simultaneous determination of
proﬁts and wages (Martins & Esteves (2007)).
This result is in line with the previous paper on rent-sharing in developing countries (Martins
& Esteves (2007);Bigsten et al. (2003)). Such absence of rent-sharing can be explained by the
weakness of labour market institutions in Indonesia. Indeed, before and after the Suharto Regime
Indonesia has not strong institutions; there are still violations on unions rights. Moreover, the
informal sector in Indonesia accounts for most of the total employment.
3.3.3 The role of the Trade Union Act of 2000
In the previous section, results show that there is no empirical evidence of traditional rent-sharing
in Indonesia. However, in the period examined there was an external shock. During the Suharto
regime independent labour unions were banned, while the Trade Union Act of 2000 guaranteed
the right to organise, permitted groups of 10 or more workers to form an union. There has been a
huge increase in the number of labour unions in the seven years since the new regulation came into
11force. Therefore, we want to investigate if the Trade Union Act of 2000 increases the bargaining
power of workers. We interact the variable proﬁt-per-employees with a time dummy T. T equals
0 for the period before the Trade Union Act of 2000 and equals 1 for the period after the law.
The wage equation estimated is the following:







3T + 4TFAi + 5Xirt + ijrt
(3.2)
Column (1) in Table (4) shows the results. The coefﬁcient of the interaction term is nega-
tive but not signiﬁcant. This result indicates that the Trade Union Act of 2000, did not affect the
"traditional" bargaining power of workers. This result could be explained by weak enforcement
institutions in Indonesia. As noted above, several developing countries have ratiﬁed ILO Funda-
mental Conventions, increase the number of domestic labour laws and authorize labour unions.
Hence, despite this reshaped regulatory environment, there is still a limited impact. In addition
to weak institutions, the lack of collective bargaining background and the lack of accountability
of labour unions might explain this result. In the following section we investigate the issue of the
lack of negotiation culture, while in section (3.3.5) we analyse the lack of accountability.
3.3.4 The complementarity between labour union and local labour NGOs
As aforementioned, there exists a strong complementarity between labour unions and local labour
NGOs. Labour unions are relatively new and unexperienced in Indonesia. The collective bargain-
ing was banned and repressed since 1998 (the fall of Suharto). Moreover, the last period of the
Regime was characterized by radical movement and violent demonstration. The role embodied
by local labour NGOs was to rebuild a negotiation capacity. Therefore, labour NGOs provide
technical and legal assistance to workers, inform them on domestic labour laws and on workers’
rights. Therefore, the presence of local labour NGOs might affect the role of labour unions within
the ﬁrm, due to this strong complementarity.
Importantly for our estimation strategy, in Indonesia local labour NGOs are not present in
every province.16 We use a difference in difference approach in order to investigate the role of
16We observe the location of labour NGOs in Indonesia on a dataset of indonesian NGOs constructed by SMERU,
12labour NGOs after the labour laws (Trade Union Act 2000) in a country with lack of individual
background of negotiation. We consider the difference in wage between province with local labor
NGOs and province without local labour NGOs, for the period before and after the Trade Unions
Act of 2000. Therefore, we constuct a variable by interacting the time dummy T and the province
dummy NGO, where NGO = 1 for province with labour NGOs and NGO = 0 for province without
labour NGOs.
The wage equation estimated is the following:







+4TFAi + 5Xirt + 6NGOrt + 7TNGOrt + ijrt
(3.3)
Column (2) in Table (4) presents the results, with Treatment deﬁned as ﬁrm located in a
province with labour NGOs. The dependent variable is, as before, the average wage. Column
(2) reports coefﬁcient estimates when we include export dummy, the minimum wage, and other
control at ﬁrm and province level (e.g. the size of the ﬁrm, the number of skilled workers). The
coefﬁcient of the Treatment is positive and highly signiﬁcant. This result shows that the comple-
mentarity between labour NGOs and labour unions has a strong and positive impact on wage. The
role of labour NGOs to rebuild a negotiation capacity is indeed realized. Notice that we control for
export since this might affect the decision of the ﬁrm to pay higher wage due to reputation effect
in province with outside pressure of NGOs. The export dummy is positive and high signiﬁcant.
This result is in line with the analysis of Harrison & Scorse (2010).
3.3.5 The visibility premium of labour unions
In the previous section, we analysed the impact of labour NGOs on the outcome in a country
with lack of individual background of negotiation. However, we did not control for sector. Our
theoretical ﬁndings show that labour unions have two contradictory objectives in sensitive sectors,
due to ﬁnancing constraint : increase their visibility (i.e. the number of members employed in the
formal sector) on the top of the traditional wage. Our analysis above suggests that textile, garment
a research non-proﬁt organization located in Indonesia. The province with local labour NGOs are: Nanggroe Aceh
Darussalam, Sumatera Utara, Riau, DKI Jakarta, Jawa Timur I, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Sulawesi Tenggara
13and footwear are sectors where the visibility of a labour union earns a premium.
The intuition is that the presence of NGOs gives power to labour union (increase the outside
option of workers). The results in the Difference-in-Difference estimations are consistent with this
idea. However, labour union uses this power to increase the number of member in formal sector,
in order to be more visible.
Therefore we want to investigate if the ﬁnancing constraint (the quest for visibility) of the
labour unions translates into higher or lower wages where the presence of NGOs increase outside
option of workers. We use a Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference method, in order to take into
account the external shock (before and after the Trade Union Act 2000), the role of the comple-
mentarity between labour NGOs and labour unions (province with/without labor NGOs) and the
visibility premium (textile versus other sectors).
The equation estimated is the following:







3T + 4NGOrt + 5TNGOrt + 6TNGOrtTFAi+
7TTFAi + 8TFAiNGOrt + 9Xirt + ijrt
(3.4)
Column (3) in Table (4) presents the results. The coefﬁcient of the interaction term variable T 
TFA  NGO is negative and highly signiﬁcant. This suggests that in sector with visibility for
labour union, the net outcome on wages of the presence of NGOs is negative.
Indeed, the external fundings imply a distortion in the objective of the labour union : increase
their visibility (i.e. the number of member employed in the formal sector) on the top of the
traditional wage. With the outside ﬁnancing, labour unions are accountable not just with respect
to their members but also with respect to their donors. This lack of accountability joint to the
distortion in the traditional labour union objective explain this negative result.
3.4 Employment
We have shown that the complementarity between labour unions and labour NGOs and the outside
funding of labour unions affect wage in domestic manufacturing ﬁrms. The net outcome on wage
14of the presence of NGOs is negative in sector with visibility for labour union. As aforementioned,
in Indonesia labour unions rely on Northern NGOs donations. Therefore, this result might depend
on the outside pressure from the North on labour union to increase labour standards on the top
of wage, i.e. compensate wage differentials. However, on one hand, donations to NGOs or other
institutions usually lack of auditing and monitoring mechanism. On the other hand, this negative
outcome might depend on the lack of accountability of labour unions with respect to their mem-
bers. Labour unions might have an incentive to increase their visibility to get access to external
funding.
By following Harrison and Scorse (2008), in Table 5 we replace the log of production worker
wage with the log of production worker employment as dependent variable. The coefﬁcient of
T*NGO is positive but not signiﬁcant. This suggests that the role of labour NGOs does not imply
employment declines. However, the results in Table 5 show a robust and positive coefﬁcient for
T*NGO*TFA. This result suggests a positive impact on employment in sector with visibility for
labour union and in province with labour NGOs. This is in line with our theoretical predictions.
The outside funding from the North implies a distortion in labour unions objective: increase their
visibility (i.e. the number of members employed in formal sector) on the top of the traditional
wage objective. Therefore, this reduction in wage corresponds to an employment increase. This
result suggests the existence of peculiarities in labor market institutions in developing countries.
4 Conclusion
In the present paper we developed a simple bargaining model speciﬁc to developing countries
in order to analyse the interaction between the visibility premium, the bargaining power and the
outsideopportunityofworkersintheindividualwagedetermination. Inpoorcountrieslocallabour
unions face ﬁnancial constraint. They rely on external fundings from the North. At the same time,
labour movement is characterised by a complementarity between local labour NGOs and local
labour union. The basic idea is that local labour NGOs affect the outside opportunity of workers
by increasing the available information on labour rights. Indeed, several developing countries
have just recently experienced labour unions authorisation. Therefore, there is often a lack of
collective bargaining background. Local labour NGOs provide technical and legal assistance to
workers, give information on domestic labour laws and workers’ rights. Therefore, the presence
15of labour NGOs might change the outcome of collective bargaining in countries without a culture
of negotiation.
We focused on domestic ﬁrms to analyse the role of local NGOs on workers outside MNEs
afﬁliates and with local labour unions. We investigated how the presence of NGOs and “visibility
premium” of the labour union interact with each other and their impact on the bargaining power
of workers. In this respect, we emphasized two main results. Wage increases with the presence
of labour NGOs. However, wage decreases with the visibility premium. The intuition behind this
negative result is that local labour unions have two contradictory objectives in “sensitive” sectors:
increase their visibility on the top of the traditional wage objective.
Our theoretical ﬁndings highlight two contradictory effects: the positive impact of labour
NGOs on wage and the negative impact of the visibility premium of labour unions. We tested
empirically this hypothesis of a net negative outcome on wage in province with labour NGOs and
in sector with visibility. Indonesia was an ideal case study since there was an important labour
law in 2000, the Trade Union Act, that authorised independent labour unions after 30 year of
authoritarian regime. We used Data on Indonesia manufacturing industry covering the period
before and after the labour law. First, we estimated the simple wage equation derived from the
theoretical model in order to analyse the bargaining power of workers. We found no evidence on
the traditional bargaining power of workers. Weak labour institutions and the high informality
rate in Indonesia might explain this result. Then, we investigated if the Trade Union Act increased
the bargaining power by using a simple difference methodology. We interacted the proﬁt-per-
employees variable with a time dummy indicating the period before and after the law. However,
results suggested that the Trade Union Act did not affect the outcome on wage. This result could
be explained by weak enforcement institutions in Indonesia, as well as by the lack of a collective
bargaining background and the lack of accountability of labour unions.
In Indonesia, as other developing countries, there is a strong complementarity between labour
NGOs and labour unions. Labour NGOs provide technical assistance and additional information
on labour rights. Indeed, the role embodied by local labour NGOs was to rebuild a negotiation
capacity. Therefore, the presence of local labour NGOs might affect the role of labour unions
within the ﬁrm. We used a Difference-in-Difference method in order to study the difference in
wage between province with labour NGOs (our treatment) and province without labour NGOs (our
16control), before and after the labour laws (Trade Union Act 2000). We found that the presence of
NGOs has a positive impact on wage. Therefore, this complementarity between labour unions and
labour NGOs beneﬁt workers in a country with lack of individual background of negotiation.
However, labour institutions in Indonesia are also characterized by the external fundings of
labourunions. Thisoutsidefundingimpliesadistortioninthetraditionallabourunionobjective, as
show our theoretical ﬁndings. Therefore, we used a difference-in-difference-in-difference method
in order to study the net outcome on wage in province with labour NGOs and in sector with
visibility for labour unions. We analysed the difference between the period before and after the
Trade Union Act of 2000, in province with labour NGOs with respect to province without labour
NGOs and in TFA sector (i.e. sensitive sector) with respect to other sector. The results suggest
that in sector with visibility for labour union (sensitive sector), the net outcome on wages of the
presence of NGOs is negative. Indeed, the external fundings imply a distortion in labour union
objective: increase their visibility (i.e. the number of member employed in the formal sector) on
the top of the traditional wage. With the outside ﬁnancing, labour unions are accountable not just
with respect to their members but also with respect to their donors. This lack of accountability
joint to the distortion in the traditional labour union objective explain this negative result.
This work opens many avenue of research, as it highlights the complexity of relations on
the labour market in developing countries progressively reorienting their attitude towards more
workers-friendly institutions. For instance, there could be some form of competition among labour
unions in the South and also between labour unions and local NGOs. The outside funding mecha-
nism and its impact on labour institutions in developing countries is an important issue for further
research. Another important issue is about the outside option of workers and the relative wages
in the formal and informal sector, taking into account the compensation offered in the informal
sector for harsh working conditions. The ﬁrst issue is not necessarily relevant for Indonesia given
the good complementarity between labour unions and labour NGOs in this initial phase of the
changes on the labour market. The second issue is important even for Indonesia but unfortunately
hardly empirically documented.
17References
Aldashev, G. & Verdier, T. (2009). When ngos go global: Competition on international markets
for development donations. Journal of International Economics, 79(2), 198–210.
Antras, P. & Helpman, E. (2004). Global sourcing. Journal of Political Economy, 112 n.3, 552–
580.
Bigsten, A., Collier, P., Dercon, S., Fafchamps, M., Gunning, J. W., Oduro, A., Oostendorp, R.,
Pattillo, C., Söderbom, M., Teal, F., & Zeufack, A. (2003). Risk sharing in labour markets.
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-077/2, Tinbergen Institute.
Botz, D. L. (2001). Made in Indonesia. South End Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Brown, A. (2004). Labour, Politics and the State in Industriaizing Thailand. Lon-
don:RoutledgeCurzon.
Caraway, T. (2004). Protective repression, international pressure, and institutional design: Ex-
plaining labor reform in indonesia. Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID),
Volume 39, Number 3, 28–48.
Crinis, V. (2008). Malaysia: Women, labour activism and unions. in k. broadbent and m. ford,.
Women and Labour Organizing in Asia: Diversity, Autonomy and Activism, London:Routledge.
Ford, M. (2005). Accountable to whom? trade unions, labour ngos and the question of account-
ability in indonesia. Working Paper Series, n.81.
Ford, M. (2009). Workers and Intellectuals. NGOs, Trade Unions and the Indonesian Labour
Movement. Southeast Asia Publications Series.
Harrison, A.&Scorse, J.(2010). Multinationalsandanti-sweatshopactivism. AmericanEconomic
Review, 100:1, 247–273.
Martins, P. (2004). Rent sharing before and after wage bill. IZA Discussion Paper 1376.
Martins, P. & Esteves, L. A. (2007). Is there rent sharing in developing countries? matched-panel
evidence from brazil. Working Papers 0060, Universidade Federal do Paraná, Department of
Economics, IZA.
18McKay, S. (2006). The squeaky wheel’s dilemma: New forms of labor organizing in the philip-
pines. Labour Studies Journal, 30 (4), 41–63.
Rahayu, S. & Sumarto, S. (2003). The practice of industrial relations in indonesia. The SMERU
Research Institute.
19Table 1: Mean of wage, proﬁt-per-employee, number of production workers and number of
skill workers for years 1991-2005
year wage proﬁt-per-employee nbworker nbskill
1991 5,938.20 477.51 153.50 23.26
1992 13,237.26 1,147.51 157.17 25.20
1993 8,353.82 646.74 160.32 23.40
1994 8,026.54 686.72 164.06 25.63
1995 9,574.06 785.47 159.51 23.85
1996 15,498.04 1,299.08 149.46 23.42
2004 59,013.42 5,511.16 166.67 26.00
2005 60,659.13 5,785.65 159.68 24.24
Total 22,994.80 2,084.51 158.69 24.36
All values are in real Rupiahs
20Table 2: Comparison of Treatment Groups relative to Controls Prior to Treatment (1991-1996)
NGO wage proﬁt-per-employee nbworker nbskill EXP TFA
(1) Control 10,040.83 848.66 166.99 25.58 0.16 0.25
(2) Treatment 10,754.10 877.70 144.43 22.20 0.12 0.21
(3) t-test diff -1.77 -1.01 5.50*** 4.63*** 20.87*** 17.01***
Total 10,351.72 861.32 157.16 24.11 157071 157071
A * indicates the difference in means is statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05; a ** indicates the difference in means is statistically
signiﬁcant at 0.01; a *** indicates the difference in means is statistically signiﬁcant at 0.001. All values are in real Rupiahs
21Table 3: Panel regression for year 1991-2005; IV
Estmates for year 1991-2005









Province ﬁxed effect Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed effect Yes Yes
N 142093 134644
r2 0.64 0.69
First Stage F-test 11.75
Standard error in parentheses, with * indicating signiﬁ-
cance at 0.05, ** indicating signiﬁcance at 0.01 and ***
indicating signiﬁcance at 0.001. Constant term included in
all speciﬁcations but not reported here. Notes: Instrumen-
tal variable: income received from non-operational activity
22Table 4: Simple Difference; Difference in Difference;
Difference in Difference in Difference
Dep var: Average unskilled wage
D DD DDD
(1) (2) (3)
proﬁt-per-employees 0.011 0.005 0.005
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00)
T 1.71*** 0.20*** 0.25***
(0.15) (0.03) (0.03)
T*rent - 0.005 -0.002 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)












Controls Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.55 0.603 0.604
N 138045 138045 138045
Standard error in parentheses, with * indicating signiﬁcance at
0.05, ** indicating signiﬁcance at 0.01 and *** indicating signiﬁ-
cance at 0.001. Constant term included in all speciﬁcations but not
reported here. Notes: Instrumental variable: income received from
non-operational activity
23Table 5: Difference in Difference; Differ-
ence in Difference in Difference
Dep var: log production workers
1 2
Coef./se Coef./se
NGO -0.079*** 0.024*
(0.01) (0.01)
T*NGO 0.091** 0.005
(0.03) (0.03)
T -0.129*** -0.085**
(0.03) (0.03)
TFA 0.162*** 0.377***
(0.01) (0.01)
EXP 1.087*** 1.082***
(0.01) (0.01)
NGO*T*TFA 0.127***
(0.03)
TFA*NGO -0.493***
(0.02)
T*TFA -0.125***
(0.02)
Controls Yes Yes
r2 0.168 0.176
N 136766 136766
24